





How equal are politicians really? 
An experiment about gender and the effects of gender stereotypes on 













Supervisor: Elina Lindgren 
Word count: 11993 
Abstract: Experimental research in the US has shown that male and female politicians are 
evaluated differently. Such research has been lacking in a Nordic setting. By conducting an 
experiment on secondary education pupils in Sweden we bring this research into the modern 
Nordic setting and reconfirm that politicians are affected by gender stereotypes. We also look 
at the effects of an additional stereotype manipulation in which respondents are told that men 
and women often are seen as possessing different levels of authority. This type of 
manipulation has previously produced significant results in psychological experiments where 
respondents were taking math tests. In this study we see that the stereotype manipulation also 
has an effect in the evaluation of politicians. Additionally we establish that gender 
identification, previously shown to be relevant in experiments where respondents were taking 
math tests, is also relevant for the evaluation of politicians. 
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1. Introduction 
The feminist movement can today be found vibrant and alive in most western countries. 
Western countries have, in varying degrees, implemented policies to help women advance in 
public and private life. In the political life women have progressively gained representation in 
Sweden. In 1921 they gained the right to vote and in 1993 they gained more equal 
representation in parliament with the introduction of a policy to have every other slot on the 
ballot list (the order in which seats are awarded) filled by a woman by several political parties 
(Christensen, 1999: 78; Riksdagen, 2012). Women have gone from having 33% of the seats in 
1991 to having 45% of the seats in the Riksdag today (SCB).
1
 But are female and male 
politicians viewed as equal or are they still trapped in gender roles? A 1994 experiment in 
Norway, a country with similar gender equality as Sweden both then and today, found that the 
gender of a politician who authored a speech mattered for how they were perceived by the 
respondents (Matland, 1994; IPU, n.d.; IPU, 2014) . Since then no similar research has been 
done in the Nordic countries. The first purpose of this study is to find out if these differences 
remain or if other, or no, differences are found. This is interesting both because research is 
lacking and because the subject could hold great societal weight. A perceived difference 
between differently gendered politicians may be problematic for political life and the equal 
representation of men and women in politics, especially from a meritocratic point of view. To 
investigate this an experiment will be designed on the basis of Matland's 1994 experiment. 
The second purpose of this study is to see what effect the mentioning of a gender stereotype 
has on the perception of a politician. This idea derives from previous experiments in 
psychology on the performance of men and women on math tests. In these studies it was 
found that women performed worse on math tests when subjected to a stereotype before 
taking the test, i.e. being told that women had previously performed worse on the math test, 
that women perform worse on math tests in general or that their results would be used as part 
of an indicator for their gender (Schmader, 2002; Eriksson & Lindholm, 2007; Johns, 
Schmader & Martens, 2005). When not subjected to such a stereotype they perform equally to 
the men (Ibid.). A meta-analysis of the field showed that no real difference between men and 
women seem to exist (Lindberg, Hyde, Petersen & Lind, 2010). The effectiveness of the 
stereotype manipulation could be problematic for feminism. When feminists argue against the 
societal injustices they see they invariably repeat the very stereotypes they wish to defeat in 
an effort to draw attention to them. I suspect that this repetition can lead to short term 
                                                             
1 The Riksdag is the Swedish national parliament. 
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internalization of this stereotype leading the audience of the feminist to believe the stereotype 
regardless of its actual connection to reality. Perhaps this might even work in the long term if 
repeated and reinforced enough. For the purposes of this study the focus is on the short term 
effect of stereotypes in the same vein as the psychological math test studies. Given my 
suspicions it seems worthwhile to investigate if a manipulation with a stereotype repetition 
has an effect on how the male and female politicians are perceived. To investigate this an 
additional manipulation will be added to the experiment, mentioning a stereotype about men 
and women. In one American and one Swedish psychological math test experiment it was 
found that gender identification moderated the respondent's performance on the test (Eriksson 
& Lindholm, 2007; Schmader, 2002). Interestingly the results were reversed between the US 
and Swedish studies (Eriksson & Lindholm, 2007). If gender identification is at play in the 
psychological math test experiments when the stereotype manipulation is applied it might also 
be at play when the stereotype manipulation is applied in this study. Furthermore any 
difference due to gender identification that is found could carry implications for both the work 
for a gender equal society and for the scientific understanding of gender identification. The 
third purpose is therefore to broaden the knowledge gender identification and see if it has an 
effect on the evaluation of politicians as well. This will be investigated by an addition of a 
gender identification scale in the questionnaire which is based on the US and Swedish studies. 
To recap the aim of this study is to bring the political speech research in the Nordic 
countries into the 21st century while at the same time gauging the current progress of 
feminism with regards to political equality. In addition, the older study by Matland (1994) 
will be expanded by the inclusion of a stereotype manipulation adopted from psychological 
math test experiments and by looking at the potential role of gender identification in relation 
to how respondents rate the differently gendered politicians. Such an expansion offers a fresh 
perspective on the issue and will hopefully serve to fill a gap currently left open in the 
scientific community. Furthermore both the inclusion of stereotype repetition and the analysis 
of differing gender identification are important as they might carry complications for the 
wider feminist movement. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
There has been a lot of research on the impact of gender on the public perception of 
politicians. Most of this research has been done in the US. An experiment conducted by 
Sapiro (1981-1982) showed disparity between how a male and female politician were 
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perceived, with the male being seen as more competent when it came to military issues and 
more likely to win an election and the female more competent at dealing with education, 
health problems and keeping an honest government. The common denominator of these issue 
areas is that they were not mentioned in the speech (Ibid.). Voters often rely on stereotypes 
such as race and gender in low information settings, drawing from the stereotypes to fill out 
an otherwise incomplete picture of the politician's stance on issues and ideological position 
(Alexander & Andersen, 1993; McDermott, 1998). Studies using low information mock 
elections have shown that men often prefer the male candidate and females the female 
candidate (Sigelman & Sigelman, 1982; Garret & Brooks, 1987). It has been shown that 
voters believe that female candidates are more liberal, Democratic and feminist, stemming 
from their perceived compassionate nature (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Alexander & 
Andersen, 1993). Voters also believe men, being more instrumental, are generally better at 
handling crime, defence and foreign policy issues whereas women are better at compassionate 
issues like helping the poor, the elderly, day care and healthcare (Ibid.). In the US, women 
have been shown to be favourably stereotyped in low information Community Council 
elections (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Matson & Fine, 2006). One study focused on the 
potential role of party identification and found that gender stereotyping was still relevant 
despite party cues being present (Sanbonmatsu & Dolan, 2009). However, female Republican 
politicians gained less from favourable stereotypes and lost more from unfavourable ones 
(Ibid.). So, voters rely on gender stereotypes to form their opinions. The stereotyping is 
especially prevalent when little other information is given but they are still significant even 
when more information is present (Sanbonmatsu & Dolan, 2009; Matland 1994). Similar 
research in a European context does not seem to have been done. This seems to be particularly 
problematic when looking at the Nordic case, where many political parties in Sweden, 
Norway, Finland and Denmark introduced gender quotas between the mid 1970's and the mid 
1990's, giving rise to a history of female representation in politics (Christensen, 1999: 78). 
Sweden is today ranked 2nd in the Gender Inequality Index (GII) from the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and 4th in the Global Gender Gaps Report (GGGR) from 
the World Economic Forum (WEF) (UNDP, 2012; WEF, 2013: 8). This can be compared to 
the US ranking of 43 and 23 respectively, ranking behind most of Europe as well as many 
other countries around the world (Ibid.). Looking at the parliamentary representation of 
women we find that the US has a ratio of 0.22 women per man, compared to Sweden's ratio of 
0.81 women per man (WEF: 346, 370). Similar discrepancies are found when looking at 
women in ministerial posts where the US boasts only a ratio of 0.38 women per man 
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compared with Sweden's 1.09 women per man (Ibid.). The lack of female politicians may 
have an impact on the findings in the US-based studies. A study looking at rural leadership 
councils in India found that exposure to female politicians reduced the inherent societal bias 
against them (Beaman et al., 2009). Although not completely analogous to the US or national 
parliaments it makes clear that female representation is important for public perception.  
 
2.1 The Nordic case and Matland's experiment 
To find out what the situation is like in the Nordic countries we need to turn to Nordic 
studies. As mentioned above there has been a lack of such research, but there is one notable 
exception, a 1994 experiment conducted by Richard E. Matland in Norway. Norway, like 
Sweden, has good gender equality rankings with a ranking of 5 on the GII and 3 in the GGGR 
as well as better female representation ratios in the political arena (UNDP; WEF:  8, 302). 
Matland also argued for the specific case that is the Nordic countries when it comes to gender 
equality (Matland, 1994). Matland's study will be presented at length as much of this study 
will be based on it. In his experiment he gauged the opinions of secondary education pupils on 
politicians of different genders. To remove political variation in the answers Matland used 
four experiment groups, two with the same Labour Party text and two with the same 
Conservative Party text, and the respondents chose which speech to read based on which side 
of the political spectra they felt closer to. The respective Labour and Conservative texts were 
identical in their respective two groups with the only difference being the gender of the 
politician. Matland showed that when it came to policy areas men and women were 
statistically significantly rated differently in five out of fourteen policy areas in the 
Conservative group, and six out of fourteen for the Labour group. The Conservative Party 
readers found the male preferable for defence, agriculture and foreign policy and the female 
for child care policy and women's rights. The Labour Party readers found the male preferable 
for defence and the economy and the female for education, agriculture, elderly care and 
women's rights. The Conservative Party readers rated the male politician slightly better at 
arguing his policies whereas the Labour Party readers had slightly more confidence for the 
female as a MP. Because Matland used two distinctly different speeches in his experiment it 
is difficult to know if the right-left affiliation was the cause of the different ratings or if the 
actual speeches led the respondents to respond as differently as they did. Other significant 
results found was that female Conservative Party readers found the male politician to be a 
better vote getter and more likely to be elected. Labour party readers showed significant 
gender stereotyping effects even for some issues that were discussed in the speech. Matland 
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employed rather lengthy speeches for both the Conservative and the Labour Party so the 
respondents were well informed of the positions the politicians held on the discussed topics. 
The Labour Party readers differentiated between the male and female candidates with regards 
to the economy, which was discussed at length, and defence and education, which was 
mentioned briefly. This shows that gender stereotyping is not only relevant in low information 
elections but can also play a role in higher-information settings. Overall, and contrary to 
Matland's own expectations, we can see that Matland found results similar to the US studies. 
The male politician was rated favourably for defence regardless of political affiliation of the 
respondent and he was favourably viewed for the harder issues overall. The female politician 
was favourably viewed with regards to softer areas such as elderly care and child care and 
both groups saw her better at women's rights. The results were overall very strong as well, and 
prevalent even for issues discussed in the speech, something not seen in other studies. The 
interest of this study lies in whether these differences remain in place today, some 20 years 
later, or whether society's views have changed - for better or worse.  
Before moving on I would like to present my three reasons for choosing to base large parts 
of my study, notably most of the experimental design, on Matland's study. The first reason 
Matland is of importance is because of the question Matland raised; Does the gender of a 
politician matter for the evaluation of them? It is as relevant today as it was back in '94. If the 
gender of a politician truly does change the perception of them and their political competency 
then we would do well to understand why that is and in what ways it may or may not be 
problematic. Matland arrived at the conclusion that overall it seemed that men and women 
were viewed as equal but different but this conclusion was reached after he explained away 
his results by referring to the then current political situation in Norway (Matland, 1994).  
The second reason is that basing my experiment on a previous experiment increases the 
internal validity of the study. It also lets me compare my results with Matland since the 
studies so closely resemble each other. The third reason Matland is of importance to this 
study is that the experiment was conducted in Norway. The Nordic countries, as laid out 
above, offer a special case given their equality inside and outside of parliament and only 
Matland has conducted a study in this region. Building on his work then seems like the only 
logical thing to do as, to my knowledge, no other previous research in the Nordic countries 
exists. 
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2.2 Psychological math test experiments 
In the field of psychology multiple experimental studies have looked at the effects of 
priming by the means of stereotype manipulations. Pre-test priming by the means of 
stereotype manipulation has been shown effective both for gender and ethnical identification 
in the US, leading respondents to exhibit behaviour stereotypically related to their social 
group identity (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Shih, Pittinsky & Ambady, 1999; Aronson et al., 
1999). A growing body of research has shown that men and women perform unequally on 
math tests when subjected to such stereotype priming before the math test is taken. When told 
that their performance would be used as an indicator of both their individual math ability and 
an indicator of the math ability of their gender women performed worse than when told that 
the test would just give an indication of their individual math ability (Schmader et al., 2001 in 
Schmader, 2002; Schmader, 2002; Eriksson & Lindholm, 2007). When the math test was 
described as a problem-solving exercise men and women performed equally, but when the 
same test was described as a math test that would be used to test for potential gender 
differences women performed worse than men (Johns, Schmader & Martens, 2005). A meta-
analysis by Lindberg et al. (2010) of these kinds of psychological experiments and studies on 
the mathematical performance of men and women concluded that there are no real differences 
in their mathematical abilities, although the stereotype of boys and men being better at math 
seems to be prevalent in all age groups. One possible explanation for the lacking performance 
from women when subjected to a negative stereotype is that such a stereotype negatively 
affects their working memory (Schmader & Johns, 2003). It seems plausible that this type of 
priming will not only affect their personal performance by lowering their working memory or 
pushing them to conform to gender identities but also affect the evaluation of others.  
 
2.3 The effects of gender identification 
Another explanation presented by Schmader (2002), citing social identity theory and self-
categorization theory, holds that respondent's self-identification with their gender is the factor 
behind the diverging results between men and women. While men performed equally well 
regardless of their individual gender identification the same was not true for women (Ibid.). 
Because the stereotype of women being worse than men at math is so prevalent women will 
want to conform to that prescribed female identity. Therefore women who identify more 
closely with their gender should also perform worse as to uphold and reproduce the stereotype 
than women who do not closely identify with their gender (Schmader, 2002). The result of 
Schmader's (2002) experiment confirmed this suspicion. However, a replicate study in 
 Page 7 of 41 
 
Sweden found contradicting results, having women who identified less with their gender 
perform worse on the math test (Eriksson & Lindholm, 2007). In both cases gender 
identification was shown to play a role but the interaction between other societal variables 
appears complex. While the explanation given by Schmader for her results compare well to 
earlier literature the results of the Swedish study leaves more open to question. Nevertheless it 
seems clear that gender identification matters and that Sweden presents a diverging case from 
the US one. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
As we could see from Matland's study the results of the US experiments held true in a 
Nordic setting. Male and female politicians are viewed differently based on their gender 
although the specifics vary within the US studies and between them and Matland. As both 
Norway and Sweden has had gender quotas in their political parties since before Matland's 
study and since the ratios of political representation in parliament as well as overall gender 
equality rating is high we have to question whether Matland's findings hold true today. A lot 
could have happened with the public perception of gender differences and gender roles. 
However, a high rating on the gender equality indexes only means that the Nordic countries 
are beating out other countries and not that gender stereotypes do not exist. While progress 
has surely been made it seems reasonable to assume that baseline gender stereotypes, whether 
they be specific to the gender stereotypes of politicians or just a reflection of the society-wide 
gender stereotypes, are still in effect. Therefore the first hypothesis is as follows; 
(1) A male politician will be rated more competent in hard issue areas such as defence policy 
and a female politician will be rated more competent in soft issue areas such as equality 
politics when no stereotype manipulation is present. 
 
In the psychological math test experiments we saw how women performed distinctly worse 
when subjected to a stereotype manipulation. The stereotype manipulation worked as a 
psychological cue making the respondents internalize and reproduce the stereotype while 
taking the test. It seems plausible that this effect could be observed even when it has nothing 
to do with the respondent's own ability to perform a task. In a political setting it seems 
reasonable that a similar internalization of a stereotype would lead respondents to rate 
political candidates differently than had they not been subjected to such a stereotype. If the 
respondents are subjected to a stereotype manipulation similar to the ones used in the 
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psychological math test experiments then we should expect the respondents to rate the female 
politician worse than the respondents receiving no such manipulation. Furthermore, judging 
from the psychological math test experiments, the male politician's ratings should remain 
virtually the same. Because the respondents are rating someone else rather than taking a test 
themselves we should still be open to the possibility of completely different results than can 
be expected from the psychological math test experiments. Nevertheless the second 
hypothesis is; 
(2) When subjected to a stereotype manipulation the female politician will be rated less 
favourably while the male's ratings will remain the same. 
 
In two of the psychological math test experiments we saw that gender identification 
mattered for how respondents were affected by the manipulation. In the US study a strong 
gender identification among women correlated with worse results on the math test. In the 
Swedish study it was the female respondents with low gender identification that performed 
worse. It is not clear what the mechanisms behind their respective identifications and the 
differing performances are (Eriksson & Lindholm, 2007). What has been shown is that it did 
matter for the respondents. The question posed in this thesis is whether it also matters when 
evaluating politicians? If a strong gender identification matters for their personal performance 
on a test it seems plausible that it will also matter for their evaluation of others. Seeing the 
world through their own eyes, so to speak. The gender norms of society might be interpreted 
differently by those who identify strongly with their gender and those who do not. As no 
similar research has been done before and because the original psychological studies had 
different results it seems impossible to know in which direction the effect will go, but they 
indicate that we will find an effect. The third hypothesis therefore reads; 
(3) Differing gender identification will lead to different evaluations of the political candidates 
regardless of whether the stereotype manipulation is present or not. 
 















When thinking about how to best answer the three hypotheses two methodological choices 
seem to stand out. A large survey study and a multi-group experiment. The reason these two 
stand out over other methodological choices is that they both offer a quantitative analytical 
tool that is missing in for example interview based studies. The ability to do deep multivariate 
analyses that these tools offer is important for being able to accurately pinpoint and measure 
the effects of gender, gender stereotype and gender identification. One reason a survey study 
would be problematic in this case is because it would be hard to ask questions that would give 
us the answers to the hypotheses. Many respondents would probably feel unease when 
pressed to give an answer to a direct question such as "Would you favour a male politician 
over a female politician" and might lie or otherwise withhold their views. An experiment on 
the other hand gives us the possibility to measure the direct effect of gender in a way that a 
survey study would not. Likewise, hypotheses two is unanswerable in a survey study as it 
requires us to measure the direct effect of the stereotype manipulation. Lastly, survey studies 
have, unlike experimental ones, previously failed to find differences (Kahn, 1996: 9). 
 
4.1 Population and selection 
The target population of the experiment is Swedish secondary education pupils. This 
decision was made due to the fact that Matland (1994) used Norwegian secondary education 
pupils and our goal is to maximize comparability with his study. The answer to hypothesis 
one, whether the male politician is seen as more competent at hard issues and the female at 
soft issues, will be more useful when we have Matland's baseline to compare it to. To be able 
to do that we should try to maximize comparability in selection as well. In doing so we'll 
know that any potential changes are due to either the potential differences between Norway 
and Sweden or due to the time that has passed rather than different approaches to the 
experiment. While the respondents will not necessarily reflect the views of the national 
population they offer a good insight in to what images young people are getting, from media 
Gender of politician Perception of politician 
Gender identification Stereotype manipulation 
Model 1. 
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or elsewhere. One advantage is the fact that the age span will be very small, requiring less 
respondents for a significant result by producing more homogenous groups. Since the age 
span is smaller and the respondents are still in school other potential heterogeneous group 
features such as marriage, children and different occupations are limited. Out of the desired 
population a necessary geographical limitation was made due to lacking resources, in effect 
limiting the selection to secondary education pupils in Gothenburg. Gothenburg is Sweden's 
second largest city and as such it has several big secondary education schools that accept 
children from all parts of the city giving a spread of both social and geographical (in the 
suburban-urban sense) background. A suitable number of 400 respondents were estimated 
based on power analyses using effect from Matland's (1994) study. A target power of 0.80 
was used for the power analyses. 
Due to time constraints and great difficulty in finding willing schools for the experiment 
the actual number of respondents ended up being 272.
2
 These classes came from four different 
schools, all of which accepted pupils from the larger Gothenburg region. 
 
5. Experimental design 
The experiment is in large parts based on Matland's 1994 experiment. The experiment was 
of a 2x2 factorial design. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four different 
groups. No neutral (genderless) control group was created as it would serve little purpose to 
answer the hypotheses. Only the differences between the differently manipulated groups is of 
interest. All groups read the same speech but received different manipulations in the 
following way: For group one and three the politician was male. For group two and four the 
politician was female. In group three and four an additional manipulation was introduced 
where the mentioning of a stereotype was present in the instructions. The stereotype 
manipulation read "We know, for example, that male and female politicians are often seen to 
possess different levels of authority"
3
. This form of manipulation was chosen because it was 
ambiguous enough to let the respondent's own preconceived stereotypes flourish while at the 
same time strong enough to make the respondents actively think in a stereotypical way about 
the way male and female politicians may exhibit differences. In groups one and two a vacuous 
replacement sentence was used, "In this study a total of three speeches are used, spread over 
different secondary education classes", which directly precedes the next sentence (identical in 
                                                             
2
 Nine out of the 12 classes were only obtained due to the help of a personal acquaintance who working as a 
secondary education teacher. 
3 Translated from Swedish. 
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all groups), "The speech you will now get to read is one of three different speeches that will 
be used in the study"
4
. The choice to include this sentence, which only repeats information 
without adding anything new, was made on the basis of having uniform front pages for all the 
respondents. These groups are unlike the ones used by Matland as he separated people by 
Labour-Conservative affiliation to not have left-right biases overshadow the respondents' 
gender-related biases. Separating respondents into two distinct ideological groups with 
different speeches affects the overall design idea that everyone will be reading the same 
speech. It seems more efficient and statistically sound to control for political affiliation in the 
questionnaire. 
The instructional front page included both gender, as in Matland's experiment, and, in 
groups three and four, stereotype manipulation. The respondents were asked to participate in a 
study where they would evaluate a political candidate based on a speech. The study claimed 
to be about how different speeches affected perception of the politician, and claimed that 
different classes were given different speeches. This cover story has been used previously 
with good results (Sapiro, 1981-1982). 
 
5.1 Speech design 
The speech was rather long at one full A4 page, a conscious choice made on the basis of 
Matland (1994). It covered the policy areas of children/kindergarten, unemployment, 
research, the economy and healthcare. The speech was kept rather politically neutral, avoiding 
any obvious party cues such as solidarity or taxes. The aim was not to have the speech 
completely neutral, only neutral enough to not drown out any gender-related bias. Given that 
the speech talks about all of these areas in a way that calls for improvement it is possible that 
the respondents are more likely to place the politician in the camp of the opposition, but as it 
shouldn't be obvious it is unlikely that this subtle distinction would be problematic for the 
validity of the experiment. The speech itself was constructed using parts of a speech held by 
the Social Democratic Party leader Stefan Löfven at Almedalen, a gathering of all the parties 
in the Swedish parliament that happens once a year
5
. Basing the speech on an actual political 
speech helps make the speech more realistic and strengthens the external validity. To avoid 
any obvious recognition only carefully selected parts of Löfvens rather lengthy speech was 
used and large parts were rewritten with about half the speech being original work by me. In 
the questionnaire a control for whether respondents listened to speeches held at Almedalen 
                                                             
4
 Translated from Swedish. 
5 More information about Almedalen can be found at Almedalsveckan.info 
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was included, and is controlled for during the analysis below. The speech seems to have been 
fairly well designed from a left-right neutrality standpoint. When asked what party the 
respondents thought the politician came from 53.3% answered a left bloc party and 40.6% 
answered a right bloc party.
6
 The final speech ended up similar to Matland (1994) in that it 
covered several policy areas and was quite lengthy rather than brief.  
 
5.2 Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire was, apart from differing genders of the politicians, identical in all 
groups. The questionnaire opened with questions about the politician who's speech they've 
just read. The questions revolved around how they thought the politician would perform as an 
MP, as prime minister, how well they thought the politician argued their politics and what 
they thought about the politician in fourteen different policy areas (the economy, healthcare, 
agriculture, defence, education, transportation, foreign policy, unemployment, environment, 
elderly care, tax policy, gender equality, rural development and child care policy). Questions 
about whether they would support the politician and the politician's electability were also 
included. Control questions for age, gender, social background, political affiliation, political 
interest and what programme they are studying was present in the latter half of the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was based on Matland's (1994) questionnaire but with a few 
changes. First, all of the questions relating to Matland's cover story were all dropped. These 
were a few questions on youth membership in Norwegian parties that were placed at the front 
of the questionnaire. The removed questions were never used by Matland in his analysis 
(Matland, 1994). Second, as the original experiment was held in Norwegian some things were 
rewritten for a Swedish and up to date context. Notable examples of this is Women's Rights, a 
term unfamiliar to Swedish voters, being translated to roughly Gender equality politics and 
Friend of nature and the environment being changed to Environmental politics
7
. Whenever 
possible the exact translation was used to maximize the comparability with Matland's study. 
Third, a few questions have been added. These are a question of what the respondent thought 
of the speech, a control question for left-right identification on the political spectrum, four 
questions regarding their gender identification and a manipulation control question. The 
manipulation control let respondents write freely to answer the question of whether they 
thought that there was any difference between male and female politicians and if so, what. 
                                                             
6
 The remainder were made up of "Other party" and the Sweden Democrats, who currently lack a clear bloc 
affiliation. Non-answers were not included. 
7 Translated from Swedish and Norwegian to English for the purpose of presentation.  
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The idea was that, through a qualitative analysis, respondents subjected to the stereotype 
manipulation would mention authority or other words such as leadership, etc, more frequently 
than respondents in the other groups. The layout of the questionnaire was kept as similar to 
Matland's as possible given these changes. 
Four questions about gender identification were added to the questionnaire directly 
following the control question for gender. They are based on a modified Collective Self-
Esteem Scale as used by Schmader (2002) and Eriksson & Lindholm (2007), both 
psychological math test experiments. The questions read; "Being a woman/man is an 
important part of my self-image", "Being a woman/man is unimportant to my sense of what 
kind of person I am", "Being a woman/man is an important reflection of who I am" and 
"Being a woman/man has very little to do with how I feel about myself". The respondents 
answered on a scale of 1, strongly disagree, to 5, strongly agree. The questions were later 
indexed to one variable of gender identification, with questions two and four reverse scored. 
 
5.3 Validity measures & Classroom appearance 
Several measure were taken to minimize human error while preparing, conducting and 
processing the experiment. Random assignment was employed to create groups with similar 
composition of respondents. A randomized list was created, sorting all intended 400 
respondents into the four groups of the experiment.
8
 The questionnaires were then sorted in 
the order of the list.
9
 
 When conducting the experiment I introduced myself as a student from Gothenburg 
University, doing research for my bachelor's thesis. To avoid spoiling the manipulations 
respondents were asked to not ask questions and told that all instructional information was 
available on the first page. The lack of verbal instructions was intentional since forcing them 
to read the instructions ensured that respondents in group three and four would read their 
manipulations. Although respondents had been asked to not ask questions complications still 
arose in two classes. While not ideal, an ANOVA test showed that the respondents from these 
classes were spread out evenly enough among the four groups to still be included.
10
 Because 
of this and the already reduced number of respondents (272) from the ideal (400) these two 
classes are still included. 
                                                             
8
 This resulted in slightly uneven groups due to the fact that only 272 respondents ended up being included. The 
number of respondents per group are important for finding significant results, but only adversely affects validity 
if the respondents in the groups are not similarly composed. 
9
 During sorting all the questionnaires were double-checked for errors. 
10 Dependent: Group variable (1-4). Independent: Classes. Potentially problematic class respondents set as 1, 
rest set at 2. Class 1: F(1,270) = 1.15, p = 0.22. Class 2: F(1,270) = 0.39, p = 0.53. 




The analysis will be separated into five steps. For randomization control we will first do 
ANOVA tests that control for the respondent's background variables such as gender and 
social background. In the second step group one (male politician, no stereotype manipulation) 
and two (female politician, no stereotype manipulation) will be analyzed and compared to 
Matland's 1994 findings to answer hypothesis one. In the third step group one (male 
politician, no stereotype manipulation) and three (male politician with stereotype 
manipulation) will be analyzed as part of answering hypotheses two. In the fourth step group 
two (female politician, no stereotype manipulation) and four (female politician with 
stereotype manipulation) will be analyzed to also answer hypothesis two. In step five we'll 
look at gender identification in all groups in order to answer hypothesis three. 
 
6.1 Randomization and manipulation control 
For an experiment to have good internal validity it is important that the respondents in the 
various groups in the experiment are statistically similar to each other with regards to factors 
which might influence the respondent's responses (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson & 
Wängnerud, 2012: 93-95). The first step to ensure internal validity is the randomization done 
before the experiment and the second step, this step, is to make sure that the randomization 
process didn't lead to differently composed experiment groups (Esaiasson et al., 2012: 330-
331). To control for this several ANOVA tests were used.
11
 The ANOVA tests employed the 
group variable (1-4) as the dependant variable and the respective background variable as the 
independent variable.
12
 If the result of the ANOVA test was statistically insignificant then the 
groups can be said to be similarly composed (Brace, Kemp & Snelgar, 2002). Overall only 
one statistically significant result was found. Left-right identification was significant at the 
p≤0.01 level marking a difference between the groups (F(4,245) = 4.16, η2 = 0.06, p = 
0.003).
13
 To see whether this difference would be problematic for the experiment overall a 
regression analysis was employed over all 19 questions used in the analysis below.
14
 Tax 
policy and foreign policy turned up at a p<0.1 level (Tax policy: R
2
 = 0.02, F(1,96) = 2.80, p 
                                                             
11
 The following variables were controlled for: Gender, age, social background (parents education, 
city/suburb/countryside upbringing), political interest, political affiliation (left/right scale and political party vote 
preference), whether they followed the speeches held at Almedalen, how often they read political material, how 
often they had private discussions about politics and what programme they are studying. 
12
 Invalid answers and non-answers were excluded from the ANOVA. 
13
 Full results available in Appendix A. 
14 For the purpose of the regression all respondents were treated as one group. 
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= 0.10. Foreign policy: R
2
 = 0.02, F(1,97) = 2.96, p = 0.09, see Appendix A for all 
regressions). All other questions had non-significant results. Considering the low r
2
 values no 
further action seems necessary. 
The manipulation control proved to not be very effective. I employed a qualitative text 
analysis in which I counted and categorized words and sentences the respondents had used to 
answer the manipulation question, "Do you think that there's any difference between male and 
female politicians? If so, what?". Similar amounts of "no", "don't know" and variations of 
other answers were observed in both the stereotype manipulated and non-manipulated groups 
with no noticeable differences. The manipulation seems to have gone through due to the 
results below but the manipulation control does not seem to have been aptly designed to do its 
job. My recommendation for future studies is to find an alternative solution for manipulation 
control. 
 
6.2 Analysis of group one and group two
15
 
As hypothesised above we expect to see the male politician favoured before the female 
politician by the respondents in at least some areas, and drawing from Matland (1994) we 
should expect to see differences with regards to both the respondent's own gender and the 
respondent's political affiliation in how the respondents rate the politician. 
 To maximize comparability with Matland (1994) and because the effects are easy to 
estimate a T-test was used to analyse the respondent's answers. Respondents were indifferent 
to a male or female politician with regards to their ability to argue their policies and their 
expected performance as an MP. Respondents did however expect the female politician to 
perform better as prime minister (table 1). These results differ from Matland (1994) where the  
Table 1. T-test. Evaluation of Politician - Group one and two, significant results 
 Lars (Male politician)  Lena (Female politician)   
All M SD N M SD N DF T-score 
As prime 
minister 
3.50 0.84 62 3.19 0.98 53 113 1.72* 
Men M SD N M SD N DF T-score 
As prime 
minister 
3.50 0.74 22 3.00 0.73 16 36   2.07** 
Arguing 
policies 
3.38 1.17 24 2.59 0.71 17 39   2.46** 
*p≤0.1 **p≤0.05 M = Mean rating. Lower is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of respondents. DF 
= Degrees of Freedom. 1 = Remarkable, 2 = Very good, 6 = Very bad. Full results in Appendix B. 
                                                             
15 Group one = Male politician. Group two = Female politician. 
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 readers of the conservative text found the man better at arguing his policies, and the readers 
of the labour party text expected the woman to perform better as an MP. While the result isn't  
statistically significant at more than a p≤0.1 level it's still worthy of consideration.  
Things become even more interesting when we separate men and women. Men are not 
only more optimistic about the female politician's expected performance as prime minister 
than the women are, they also find her better at arguing her policies. In fact, women show no 
significant effect for any of the questions. When conducting the experiment I noted that the 
respondents in the Technical programme were almost exclusively male and the other three 
programmes were female dominated. Perhaps the men's preference for the female politician is 
related to their programme rather than their gender. To investigate new T-tests were made 
separating the programmes from one another. The effects of gender did not disappear in any 
of the programme specific tests. Three programmes had no significant results. The only 
statistically significant result was found in the Aesthetics programme. They were more 
positive about the performance of the female politician as prime minister, rating her 3 
(SD=0.62) and the male politician 3.66 (SD=0.88) (lower is better; T(44)=3.01, p=0.004). 
While less favourable than the male respondents (see table 1) it is more statistically 
significant. The Aesthetics programme is composed of 70% women which seems to suggest  
that different programmes aren't the reason for divergent results of the male and female 
respondents. To further investigate the potential explanatory value of the programmes a few 
regression analyses were done with gender and programme as independent variable, and the 
questions as the independent variable. However, these showed neither trend nor statistical 
significance and are not presented. What is clear is that these results diverge from Matland 
(1994), with the woman being expected to perform better as prime minister, and also seen as 
arguing better by men. 
At first glance it seems that men and women are viewed equally in the policy areas too. 
Indeed, no significant result is found for any policy area (See Appendix B). Looking deeper 
we find that men on their part prefer the male politician for the environment, elderly care and 
tax policy (table 2). While tax policy could be argued to be a hard issue area, and as such 
favourably seen as a man's area, environment policy and, especially, elderly care is harder to 
explain (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Alexander & Andersen, 1993; Matland, 1994). Do men 
simply trust the male politician more based on his gender? If that were true we should see 
significant results over more areas or, at the very least, a trend. Comparing with Matland 
(1994) we find elderly care to be the female politician's field of expertise in both the Labour 
and Conservative group. Both tax policy and environment policy are more neutral with no  
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Table 2. T-test. Competency rating in policy areas - Group one and two, significant results 
 Lars (Male)  Lena (Female)   
Men M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
Environment 2.80 0.41 15  3.75 0.87 12 25     -3.76*** 
Elderly care 2.88 0.96 16  3.64 1.08 14 28   -2.06** 
Tax policy 2.79 0.97 14  3.40 0.91 15 27 -1.76* 
Women M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
Gender 
equality 
2.97 1.06 32 
 
2.42 1.06 33 63    2.07** 
*p≤0.1 **p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01. M = Mean rating. Lower is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of 
respondents. DF = Degrees of Freedom. 1 = Very competent, 5 = Not competent. Full results in Appendix B. 
statistically significant results. Why the male respondents place environment policy so 
strongly in the male politician's favour remains an open question for future studies. 
Women on their part found the female politician more competent with regards to gender  
equality policy, but there were otherwise no statistically significant results. However, if we 
look at the numbers we can see that trend-wise the women prefer the female politician in all 
areas. A larger sample would be required to measure these effects.  
Respondents were as likely to support either of the differently gendered politicians, even 
when separated by gender. This is different from Matland (1994) where the willingness to 
support was the same between both the readers of both the Labour and the Conservative party 
texts regardless of gender, but with women believing the male politician was more likely to be 
nominated. 
Overall we've seen results which are at odds with Matland (1994). In particular, men rating 
the male politician more favourably for elderly care and environment policy is at odds not 
only with Matland but with other earlier findings as well (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; 
Alexander & Andersen, 1993; Matland, 1994). It could be argued that gender roles have 
shifted significantly in the 20 years since Matland's study. The women's results seem to 
suggest that gender roles are disappearing for politicians. At least among young women. As 
for the hypothesis it seems clear that men and women are no longer seen as better at hard or 
soft issue areas in Sweden, at least not in the sense of the older studies. Only when separated 
by gender did differences appear, and for the men these took the form of a preference for the 
male politician on a previously soft issue policy, a neutral policy and an arguably hard issue 
policy. The fact that the women found the female politician more competent at gender 
equality policy doesn't save the hypothesis, since it requires perceived competency advantage 
in hard policies for the male politician and soft policies for the female politician - and not only 
for women. Unlike Matland (1994), but in line with other previous experiments there were no 
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significant results for policy areas discussed in the speech (Sapiro, 1981-1982; Huddy & 
Terkildsen, 1993; Matson & Fine, 2006).  
Lastly, three significant results in group one was found for left-right political affiliation. 
By running several regression analyses it was found that healthcare, education and tax policy 
were slightly affected by the left-right affiliation (Healthcare: R
2 
= 0.07, F(1,60) = 4.55, p = 
0.04. Education: R
2 = 
0.05, F(1,57) = 3.20, p = 0.08. Tax policy: R
2 = 
0.12, F(1,38) = 5.25, p = 
0.03, see Appendix C for all regressions). For healthcare and tax policy respondents to the left 
gave slightly higher ratings to the male politician. These help explain why the tax policy was 
rated more favourably for the male politician of the first group. For education people on the 
right gave slightly higher ratings. Overall it seems that left-right affiliation had little do to 
with how respondents rated the politicians. This seems to suggest that either Matland's (1994) 
differences between Labour and Conservative party readers was due to the content of the 
different speeches he employed, or that the dynamics of political affiliation and gender have 
changed or were always different in Sweden. 
 
6.3 Analysis of group one and group three
16
 
We hypothesized earlier that a stereotype manipulation would negatively affect the female 
politician and not affect the male politician. In this analysis of group one, the male politician 
without stereotype manipulation, and three, the male politician with stereotype manipulation, 
we expect the ratings for the politician to stay virtually the same between the two groups. This 




There was no preference for either politician in the two groups when it came to the 
politician's expected performance as prime minister, an MP or how they judged the 
politician's ability to argue their politics. When the respondents were isolated by gender a 
slight preference for the male politician as prime minister in the group with the stereotype 
manipulation presented itself among the female respondents (Lower is better. No stereotype: 
M=3.49, SD=0.91. Stereotype: M=3.14, SD=0.77. T(72)=1.74, P=0.09). Maybe the women 
responded more favourably to the manipulation than the men, identifying and positively  
                                                             
16 Group one = Male politician. Group three = Male politician with stereotype manipulation. 
17 It is however possible that we will see differences since the proposed explanatory mechanisms behind the 
differences in the psychological math test experiments (internalization of stereotypes and impairment of working 
memory capacity being possible explanations) can't be expected to be the same for the evaluation of politicians. 
It is plausible, for example, that the word authority primes the respondents in the third group leading them to see 
the male politician in a more positive and typically male leadership role, rating him more favourably in general, 
or just in hard issue areas. 
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Table 3. T-test. Competency rating in policy areas - Group one and three, significant results 
 No Stereotype (Male)  Stereotype (Male)   
Men M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
Unemployment 2.24 1.01 25  2.84 1.25 32 55 -1.97* 
Environment 2.80 0.41 15  3.42 1.24 26 39  -1.88** 
Women M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
The Economy 2.78 0.72 36  2.45 0.72 31 65 1.84* 
Transportation 3.63 0.92 24  3.05 0.90 22 44   2.15** 
Environment 3.57 0.96 28  3.00 0.84 21 47   2.17** 
Child care 
policy 
2.47 1.11 36 
 
2.00 0.92 32 66 1.90* 
*p≤0.1 **p≤0.05. M = Mean rating. Lower is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of respondents. DF 
= Degrees of Freedom. 1 = Very competent, 5 = Not competent. Full results in Appendix D. 
linking the word authority with the male politician. The women's continued preference for the 
manipulated male politician in the policy areas seem to support this idea. Women 
significantly rated the manipulated politician better for dealing with the economy, 
transportation policy, environment policy and child care policy (table 3). The economy has 
previously been seen as a hard issue area (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Matland, 1994). What 
is surprising however is the favouring for the manipulated politician for child care policy, an 
area previously linked to women (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Matland, 1994). The  
assumption that the female respondents prefer the manipulated male politician in the hard 
issue areas, playing on his authoritative role as a man as the manipulation implied, doesn't 
seem to hold up against the evidence. If we look a bit closer we can see that the women 
favoured the manipulated male in all policy areas. This suggests that women are affected by 
the stereotype manipulation, leading them to positively link it with the male politician and 
rating him more favourably than the male politician without such manipulation. The trend is 
not statistically significant for more than four areas, and only two areas if we look at a p≤0.05 
level. For the men on the other hand the trend is reversed. They prefer the non-manipulated 
male politician in all issue areas. There is a slight significance for unemployment policy and a 
strong significance for environment policy. In the previous analysis we also saw a significant 
preference for the male politician with regards to environment policy. While it is possible that 
both the stereotype manipulation and the gender difference led to a preference for the male 
and non-manipulated male respectively (being in the same group, group one, in both analyses) 
the more likely explanation is that the male respondents in group one represent an outlier with 
regards to environment policy. Nevertheless the trend among the men is clear, the male 
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politician without the manipulation is seen as more competent in all areas. But because of the 
lack of statistical significance it is not implausible that there are no differences for men 
between the male politician with the stereotype manipulation and the one without. While I 
don't find this to be the most likely explanation some caution should still be taken when 
looking at the results. When men and women are taken together we find no significant results 
for any policy area. 
There was no difference in willingness to support the politician of either group nor of the 
perceived election chances of the politician, and with one exception the results stayed the 
same when looking at men and women separately. Women found the non-manipulated 
politician to have a slightly higher chance of being elected (Lower is better. No stereotype: 
M=3.37, SD=0.80. Stereotype: M=3.70, SD=0.85. T(76)=1.74, P=0.07). Considering that the 
trend was the opposite for all policy areas it makes no sense for women to think more 
favourably of the non-manipulated male's chances of being elected. The most likely 
explanation is simply a false positive, especially considering it is not significant at a p≤0.05 
level. 
Contrary to our second hypothesis, that the male politician's ratings will remain the same 
while the female would be rated worse, we can see that the male politician was rated both 
better and worse. Men tended to prefer the non-manipulated politician and women the 
manipulated politician. It is not too surprising that the results differ from the psychological 
experiments from which the hypothesis is derived since the psychological experiments were 
based on the personal performance of the respondents and this experiment is about the 
evaluation of others. 
 
6.4 Analysis of group two and group four
18
 
Contrary to our hypothesis, we know that there were differences for the male politician 
when the stereotype manipulation was applied. The question now is if we will, as 
hypothesized, find that the female politician is rated worse when the stereotype manipulation 
is applied? To find out we'll look at group two, the female politician without stereotype 
manipulation, and group four, the female politician with the stereotype manipulation.  
There were no significant differences when looking at the expected performance of the 
politician as an MP, as prime minister or the politician's ability to argue their policies. When 
separating respondents by gender we can see that men rated the female politician with the  
                                                             
18 Group two = Female politician. Group four = Female politician with stereotype manipulation 
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Table 4. T-test. Evaluation of Politician - Group two and four, significant results 
 No Stereotype (Female)  Stereotype (Female)   
Men M SD N M SD N DF T-score 
As prime 
minister 
3.00 0.73 16 3.74 1.18 23 37 -2.23** 
Arguing 
policies 
2.59 0.71 17 3.23 1.34 26 41 -1.82** 
** p≤0.05 M = Mean rating. Lower is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of respondents. DF = 
Degrees of Freedom. 1 = Remarkable, 2 = Very good, 6 = Very bad. Full results in Appendix E. 
 stereotype manipulation worse with regards to her expected performance as prime minister 
and her ability to argue her policies (table 4). This result did not appear for the male politician  
when he was accompanied by the stereotype manipulation. In fact, the results were reversed 
when looking at the male and female politician of group one and two, with the female being 
favoured by the men under the same two questions. This gives some credence to the  
hypothesis that the female is rated worse when the stereotype manipulation is introduced 
while the results stay the same for the male. The results for the female respondents remained 
insignificant.  
Looking at policy areas we can see that there was a preference for the non-manipulated  
politician when it came to education policy and gender equality (table 5). When separating 
men and women we find that men statistically significantly rated the non-manipulated 
politician more competent than the manipulated one when it came to education policy. 
However, they statistically significantly rated the manipulated politician more competent for 
transportation policy, environment policy, elderly care, tax policy and regional policy. The 
complexity of the stereotype manipulation's interaction with the respondents seem to have 
been underestimated. Not only is it a reversal of the expected pattern for the latter policies but 
they include a mix of soft and hard issue areas. Women on their part preferred the non-
manipulated woman for unemployment and gender equality policy. 
 There were no differences made with regards to willingness to support or perceived 
chances of being elected. When separated by gender men and women maintained their 
indifference towards the non-manipulated and manipulated politician.  
It is likely, judging from the trend in the analysis of group one and three, that the 
stereotype affected the male politician much more than it did the female politician. The 
direction of the results were also clearer for the male politician with men preferring the non-
manipulated politician and females the manipulated one. For the female politician we instead 
find results both ways, for both genders. Our hypothesis that the female would be rated worse  
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Table 5. T-test. Competency rating in policy areas - Group two and four, significant results 
 No Stereotype (Female)  Stereotype (Female)   
All M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
Education 2.33 0.98 52  2.74 1.01 62 112    -2.21** 
Gender 
equality 
2.45 1.00 47 
 
2.80 0.99 50 95  -1.75* 
Men M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
Education 2.19 0.83 16  2.80 0.96 25 39    -2.10** 
Transportation 3.36 1.01 14  2.67 0.91 18 30    2.03* 
Environment 3.75 0.87 12  2.84 0.76 19 29      3.06*** 
Elderly care 3.64 1.08 14  2.94 0.54 18 30     2.39** 
Tax policy 3.40 0.91 15  2.76 0.94 21 34     2.03** 
Rural 
development 
2.79 0.70 14 
 
2.42 0.51 19 31   1.74* 
Women M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
Unemployment 2.25 0.95 40  2.65 1.07 34 72   -1.69* 
Gender 
equality 
2.42 1.06 33 
 
2.93 1.09 28 59   -1.83* 
*p≤0.1 **p≤0.05 ***p≤0.01. M = Mean rating. Lower is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of 
respondents. DF = Degrees of Freedom. 1 = Very competent, 5 = Not competent. Full results in Appendix E. 
when the stereotype manipulation was applied does not hold up against the evidence. Rather 
the female politician is rated both better and worse after the stereotype manipulation is 
applied. It is not entirely unexpected that the results are not as clear cut as in the 
psychological math test experiments from which the manipulation is derived.  
 
6.5 Gender identification 
We saw from two psychological math test experiments that gender identification had an 
effect on the respondent's performance on the math test. In one high identification led to 
worse results for women and in the other low identification led to worse results for the women 
(Schmader, 2002 ; Eriksson & Lindholm, 2007). The effects of gender identification appears 
to be complex. To see what effect it has on the respondents in this study we will employ 
regression analyses. I chose regression because the results are clearer than a T-test. The 
variable of gender identification runs from -8 (low identification) to +8 (high identification). 
A T-test with such a variable would just be confusing. The gender identification regressions 
are done within one experiment group, for one gender, at a time. Each question has a separate 
regression for each gender and group. The questions were set as dependent and gender 
identification as independent. The idea is to have a probe into what effects gender 
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identification has for the perception of the politicians. I will limit the discussion to results 
significant at the p≤0.05 level. The regression results are presented in table 6. 
For all regressions with statistically significant results a lower identification led to a better 
rating of the politician, with the exceptions of willingness to support (women group one) and 
perceived likelihood of being elected (women group three). I suspect that respondents with 
low gender identification might be less secure in themselves and as such are more favourable  
towards others leading them. If that were true it would make a lot of sense for them to believe 
in other's competencies. The one outlier, women in group one, being less willing to support 
the politician the less they identify with their gender, contradicts this idea. At the same time 
they only present an r
2
 of 0.08, compared with the other much more forceful r
2
s going in the  
opposite direction. 
Table 6. Regression. Gender identification 
Evaluation of 
politician 
Group one  Group two  Group three  Group four 
Men Women  Men Women  Men Women  Men Women 
As an MP -0.03 -0.01  -0.06 -0.02  0.00 0.00  -0.05 -0.03 
As prime 
minister 
0.13* 0.04  -0.03 -0.03  -0.02 0.20***  -0.01 -0.01 
At arguing 
their policies 
0.02 0.02  -0.06 -0.02  -0.03 0.00  -0.04 -0.02 
Perceived competency in policy areas 
The Economy -0.04 0.03  -0.05 -0.03  0.05 0.20***  -0.03 0.02 
Healthcare -0.04 -0.01  -0.02 -0.02  -0.01 0.08**  -0.04 -0.03 
Agriculture 0.00 -0.04  -0.06 -0.05  0.16** -0.01  -0.04 -0.06 
Defence -0.07 -0.04  0.04 0.00  0.18** -0.04  0.09 -0.04 
Education 0.03 0.03  0.00 -0.02  0.00 0.08*  -0.01 -0.02 
Transportation 0.04 0.05  0.02 0.00  -0.04 -0.02  -0.05 -0.03 
Foreign policy 0.19** 0.05  0.28** -0.04  0.09* 0.10*  -0.06 -0.03 
Unemployment -0.04 -0.02  -0.06 0.05*  0.00 0.12**  -0.01 0.11** 
Environment 0.01 -0.01  -0.03 -0.04  -0.01 0.03  -0.04 -0.04 
Elderly care 0.53*** 0.02  0.00 -0.04  -0.04 0.11*  -0.06 -0.02 
Tax policy 0.34** -0.02  0.01 -0.04  -0.03 0.25***  0.10* -0.04 
Gender 
equality 
-0.01 -0.03  0.40*** 0.07*  0.02 0.03  -0.05 0.04 
Rural 
development 
0.22** -0.05  0.14 -0.02  0.00 0.13*  -0.03 0.16* 
Child care 
policy 













*p≤0.1 **p≤0.05 ***p≤0.01. Comments: Adjusted R2 used exclusively. 
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No question or policy area seems always covariate with gender identification. Indeed, no 
question or policy turns up more than twice across groups and genders. This would suggest 
one of two things. Either the gender identification shown here is simply a symptom of another 
underlying cause that is prompting the respondents to both rate the politician more favourably 
and feel less identified with their gender. Or the complexity of gender identification might be  
even more complex in how it interacts than thought previously. Another possibility is that the 
gender identification scale employed simply isn't a good tool for the job giving unreliable 
results. In group one and two we see several significant results for men and in total only one 
for women. On the other hand women show several significant results in group three. This is 
interesting since we saw in the analysis above that this is the group where women were much 
more favourable towards the male politician than they were in the first group. 
Overall it seems we cannot form a proper opinion on what causes gender identification to 
be relevant in a question. The differences in gender identification do not correspond to the 
questions and policy areas which had significant results on the T-tests above either. What is 
clear, however, is that gender identification can play a role, even if it did not in the majority of 
cases. The hypothesis therefore gets support. Our initial probe suggests that further study is 
needed to understand the relationship between gender identification and the perception of 
both male and female politicians. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Male and female politicians are not always viewed as equal. But it does seem like we've 
moved forward from the time of Matland's (1994) study. In fact men preferred the female 
politician before the male one for prime minister and found her better at arguing her policies. 
We also saw only small differences for the policy areas. These differences are similar to the 
differences Matland (1994) found in number. There is an important difference, though. Men 
found the male politician preferable for elderly care, in contrast to it often being seen as a 
woman's area (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Matland, 1994). Perhaps gender roles are slowly 
shifting. They still seem to be active at a low level, but the results of the experiment does not 
suggest that there is any large scale discrimination by neither men nor women. It is entirely 
plausible that the results could be fully explained by the respondents having good views of a 
certain politician with a specific gender that they think has done good things in the areas they 
rated differently. This seems likely for elderly care. And it also seems likely for environment 
policy which has not previously been linked to either gender (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993, 
 Page 25 of 41 
 
Matland, 1994). We've seen no evidence in favour of our first hypothesis, that the male 
politician will be rated more competent in hard issue areas such as defence policy and the 
female politician will be rated more competent in soft issue areas such as equality politics. 
Our results instead lead us to discard our first hypothesis. 
The mentioning of the gender stereotype also produced results. Unexpectedly the male 
politician was seen as both less competent (by men) and more competent (by women). The 
female politician also produced unexpected results, being seen as both more competent and 
less competent. My suspicion that the mentioning of a stereotype also has an effect on the 
evaluation of others seems to have been confirmed but the interactions seem harder to judge 
than I had anticipated. On the basis of this evidence the second hypothesis must be discarded. 
We expected the stereotype to not adversely affect the male politician but our results were of 
the opposite nature. Likewise, there were several positive results for the female politician 
which also speaks against the hypothesis. 
Gender identification has been shown to be just as complex if not more so than it was in 
the psychological math test experiments from which it was derived. What we have seen is that 
it does have an effect and that the causal relationship in perception seems to be that 
respondents become more favourable towards the politician when they identify less with their 
own gender, regardless of the politician's gender. The third hypothesis, that gender 
identification would have an effect, can be confirmed.  
Beyond the hypotheses we found that the gender of the respondents have a great effect on 
how they perceived the politicians in all groups. Male and female respondents had very 
different opinions for almost all of the statistically significant results. Not only does it seem 
that the gender of the politician matters, the gender of the respondents does too. 
In the introduction I introduced the idea that the mentioning of stereotypes could lead to 
the internalization of that very same stereotype by the audience. It seems that there is some 
truth to this idea. If one wishes to mitigate the effects of repeating a stereotype, as to not 
reinforce it, then saying it is untrue may work well (Johns, Schmader & Martens, 2005).  
My recommendation for future research is take a closer look at the effects of the 
respondent's own gender. What triggers male and female respondents to answer differently, 
and does it matter for the politicians in the real world? Another recommendation would be to 
more rigorously explore the effects of gender identification as a moderating variable. When 
does gender identification matter? Why does it matter for the evaluation of politicians? And is 
it really gender identification at play or it is just the variable that pops up into the foreground 
in place of the real underlying variable? 
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9. Appendices 
9.1 Appendix A - ANOVA-test for randomization & Regression for left-right affiliation 
ANOVA-test. Randomization control 
   
Background variable DF F η2 
Gender 1 1.17 0.00 
Age 4 0.68 0.01 
City-countryside upbringing 3 1.13 0.01 
Parents' education level 3 1.76 0.02 
Left-Right identification 4       4.16*** 0.06 
Political party identification 8 0.68 0.02 
Next best party identification 8 1.26 0.05 
Political interest 4 0.78 0.01 
Familiarity with Almedalen speeches 3 0.23 0.00 
Frequency of political material reading 3 1.26 0.01 
Frequency of political discussions 4 0.99 0.01 
Programme 3 1.37 0.02 
***p≤0.01 DF = Degrees of freedom. Comments: Group variable (1-4) used as dependent. 
Respective background variable used as independent. 
 
Regression. Control for the effects of left-right affiliation.  
Evaluation of the politician R
2
 P  
As an MP 0.02 0.13  
As prime minister 0.01 0.24  
Arguing policies 0.00 0.57  
Perceived competency in policy areas R
2
 P  
The Economy 0.00 0.90  
Healthcare 0.00 0.76  
Agriculture 0.00 0.75  
Defence 0.02 0.21  
Education 0.00 0.95  
Transportation 0.00 0.87  
Foreign policy 0.03 0.09  
Unemployment 0.00 0.95  
Environment 0.01 0.51  
Elderly care 0.00 0.56  
Tax policy 0.03 0.10  
Gender equality 0.00 0.86  
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Rural development 0.01 0.53  
Child care policy 0.00 0.69  
Further evaluation R
2
 P  
Willingness to support 0.01 0.36  
Chances of being elected 0.01 0.32  
Comments: The respondents were treated as one group for the regression analysis. Left-right 
affiliation used as independent, respective question used as dependent. 
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9.2 Appendix B - T-test tables for analysis of group one and two 
T-test. Evaluation of Politician - Group one and two 
 Lars (Male politician)  Lena (Female politician)   
All M SD N M SD N DF T-score 
As an MP 3.14 0.69 63 2.96 0.86 52 113  1.25 
As prime 
minister 
3.50 0.84 62 3.19 0.98 53 113    1.72* 
Arguing 
policies 
3.1 1.03 66 2.91 0.82 58 122  0.96 
Men M SD N M SD N DF T-score 
As an MP 3.26 0.49 23 3.19 0.75 16 37  0.38 
As prime 
minister 
3.50 0.74 22 3.00 0.73 16 36      2.07** 
Arguing 
policies 
3.38 1.17 24 2.59 0.71 17 39      2.46** 
Women M SD N M SD N DF T-score 
As an MP 3.10 0.79 39 2.86 0.90 36 73  1.24 
As prime 
minister 
3.49 0.91 39 3.27 1.07 37 74  0.95 
Arguing 
policies 
2.95 0.86 41 3.05 0.84 41 80 -0.52 
*p≤0.1 **p≤0.05 M = Mean rating. Lower is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of respondents. DF 
= Degrees of Freedom. 1 = Remarkable, 2 = Very good, 6 = Very bad. 
 
T-test. Competency rating in policy areas - Group one and two 
 Lars (Male)  Lena (Female)   
All M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
The Economy 2.75 0.68 60  2.69 0.73 52 110  0.43 
Healthcare 2.26 0.84 66  2.26 1.01 56 121 -0.03 
Agriculture 3.51 0.74 35  3.41 0.89 34 67  0.52 
Defence 3.58 0.96 40  3.59 0.96 34 72 -0.60 
Education 2.51 0.93 63  2.33 0.98 52 113  1.01 
Transportation 3.50 0.88 40  3.38 0.98 37 75  0.57 
Foreign policy 2.73 0.93 49  2.79 0.97 43 90 -0.28 
Unemployment 2.28 1.11 67  2.29 0.91 56 121 -0.01 
Environment 3.30 0.88 44  3.37 1.07 41 83 -0.33 
Elderly care 3.05 1.01 42  3.22 1.26 41 81 -0.69 
Tax policy 2.90 1.02 41  3.09 1.06 45 84 -0.83 
Gender 
equality 
2.73 1.00 51 
 
2.45 1.00 47 96  1.38 
Rural 
development 
2.90 0.75 39 
 
2.74 0.74 35 72  0.89 




2.28 1.00 61 
 
2.21 1.00 47 106  0.34 
 Lars (Male)  Lena (Female)   
Men M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
The Economy 2.74 0.62 23  2.88 0.81 16 37 -0.60 
Healthcare 2.12 0.73 25  2.18 0.88 17 40 -0.23 
Agriculture 3.31 0.63 13  3.33 0.49 12 23 -0.11 
Defence 3.50 1.10 16  3.73 0.79 11 25 -0.60 
Education 2.52 0.92 25  2.19 0.83 16 39  1.17 
Transportation 3.31 0.79 16  3.36 1.01 14 28 -0.14 
Foreign policy 2.63 0.60 19  2.80 0.94 15 32 -0.64 
Unemployment 2.24 1.01 25  2.38 0.81 16 39 -0.45 
Environment 2.80 0.41 15  3.75 0.87 12 25     -3.76*** 
Elderly care 2.88 0.96 16  3.64 1.08 14 28     -2.06** 
Tax policy 2.79 0.97 14  3.40 0.91 15 27   -1.76* 
Gender 
equality 
2.33 0.77 18 
 
2.50 0.85 14 30 -0.58 
Rural 
development 
2.67 0.62 15 
 
2.79 0.70 14 27 -0.49 
Child care 
policy 
2.04 0.75 24 
 
2.13 0.72 16 38 -0.35 
 Lars (Male)  Lena (Female)   
Women M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
The Economy 2.78 0.72 36  2.61 0.69 36 70  1.00 
Healthcare 2.38 0.90 40  2.30 1.07 40 78  0.34 
Agriculture 3.64 0.79 22  3.45 1.06 22 42  0.65 
Defence 3.63 0.88 24  3.52 1.04 23 45  0.37 
Education 2.54 0.93 37  2.39 1.05 36 71  0.65 
Transportation 3.63 0.92 24  3.39 0.99 23 45  0.84 
Foreign policy 2.83 1.10 29  2.79 0.99 28 55  0.15 
Unemployment 2.34 1.17 41  2.25 0.95 40 79  0.38 
Environment 3.57 0.96 28  3.21 1.11 29 55  1.32 
Elderly care 3.15 1.05 26  3.00 1.30 27 51  0.47 
Tax policy 3.04 1.00 26  2.93 1.11 30 54  0.37 
Gender 
equality 
2.97 1.06 32 
 
2.42 1.06 33 63      2.07** 
Rural 
development 
3.09 0.79 23 
 
2.71 0.78 21 42  1.57 
Child care 
policy 
2.47 1.11 36 
 
2.26 1.12 31 65  0.78 
*p≤0.1 **p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01. M = Mean rating. Lower is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of 
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respondents. DF = Degrees of Freedom. 1 = Very competent, 5 = Not competent. 
 
T-test. Additional evaluation of the politician - Group one and two 
 Lars (Male politician)  Lena (Female politician)   










3.34 0.75 67 3.40 0.75 58 123 -0.40 










3.32 0.69 25 3.12 0.60 17 40  0.98 










3.37 0.80 41 3.51 0.78 41 80 -0.84 
M = Mean rating. Higher is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of respondents. DF = Degrees of 
Freedom. § 1 = Would never want to support, 4 = Would certainly want to support. # 1 = No chance, 5 = Very 
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9.3 Appendix C - Left-Right political spectrum table for analysis one 
Regression. Group one and two, left-right political spectrum affiliation 
 Group one  Group two 





As an MP 0.01 0.59  0.01 0.58 
As prime minister 0.00 0.62  0.01 0.58 
Arguing policies 0.00 0.72  0.04 0.15 




 P  R
2
 P 
The Economy 0.00 0.79  0.03 0.23 
Healthcare 0.07 0.04  0.01 0.42 
Agriculture 0.00 0.77  0.00 0.72 
Defence 0.01 0.49  0.02 0.74 
Education 0.05 0.08  0.04 0.18 
Transportation 0.01 0.52  0.01 0.57 
Foreign policy 0.01 0.52  0.04 0.20 
Unemployment 0.01 0.36  0.01 0.58 
Environment 0.00 0.82  0.03 0.28 
Elderly care 0.00 0.94  0.06 0.11 
Tax policy 0.12 0.03  0.06 0.11 
Gender equality 0.00 0.82  0.00 0.86 
Rural development 0.01 0.53  0.00 0.86 
Child care policy 0.02 0.31  0.00 0.77 
Further evaluation R
2
 P  R
2
 P 
Willingness to support 0.00 0.82  0.01 0.36 
Chances of being elected 0.00 0.79  0.01 0.57 
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9.4 Appendix D - T-test tables for analysis of group one and three. 
T-test. Evaluation of Politician - Group one and three 
 No Stereotype (Male)  Stereotype (Male)   
All M SD N M SD N DF T-score 
As an MP 3.14 0.69 63 3.15 0.89 68 129 -0.03 
As prime 
minister 
3.48 0.84 62 3.29 0.84 66 126  1.32 
Arguing 
policies 
3.08 1.03 66 2.85 1.00 72 136  1.32 
Men M SD N M SD N DF T-score 
As an MP 3.26 0.45 23 3.36 0.82 33 54 -0.54 
As prime 
minister 
3.50 0.74 22 3.43 0.90 30 50  0.28 
Arguing 
policies 
3.38 1.17 24 3.00 1.14 32 54  1.20 
Women M SD N M SD N DF T-score 
As an MP 3.10 0.79 39 2.88 0.84 34 71  1.15 
As prime 
minister 
3.49 0.91 39 3.14 0.77 35 72    1.74* 
Arguing 
policies 
2.95 0.86 41 2.74 0.88 39 78  1.06 
*p≤0.1 M = Mean rating. Lower is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of respondents. DF = Degrees 
of Freedom. 1 = Remarkable, 2 = Very good, 6 = Very bad. 
 
T-test. Competency rating in policy areas - Group one and three 
 No Stereotype (Male)  Stereotype (Male)   
All M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
The Economy 2.75 0.68 60  2.59 0.80 63 121  1.21 
Healthcare 2.26 0.85 66  2.22 0.89 72 136  0.24 
Agriculture 3.51 0.74 35  3.53 0.81 45 78 -0.11 
Defence 3.58 0.96 40  3.50 0.95 44 82  0.36 
Education 2.51 0.93 63  2.51 1.07 68 129 -0.04 
Transportation 3.50 0.88 40  3.29 1.06 51 89  0.99 
Foreign policy 2.73 0.93 49  2.81 0.84 52 99 -0.41 
Unemployment 2.28 1.11 67  2.46 1.12 70 135 -0.87 
Environment 3.30 0.88 44  3.21 1.09 48 90  0.42 
Elderly care 3.05 1.01 42  3.22 1.11 50 90 -0.77 
Tax policy 2.90 1.02 41  2.94 1.00 50 89 -0.18 
Gender 
equality 
2.73 1.00 51 
 
2.69 1.01 58 107  0.18 
Rural 
development 
2.90 0.75 39 
 
2.90 0.85 42 79 -0.04 




2.28 1.00 61 
 
2.15 0.96 62 121  0.76 
 No Stereotype (Male)  Stereotype (Male)   
Men M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
The Economy 2.74 0.62 23  2.74 0.86 31 52 -0.01 
Healthcare 2.12 0.73 25  2.42 0.90 33 56 -1.38 
Agriculture 3.31 0.63 13  3.58 0.93 24 35 -0.96 
Defence 3.50 1.10 16  3.81 1.08 21 35 -0.86 
Education 2.52 0.92 25  2.69 1.00 32 55 -0.65 
Transportation 3.31 0.79 16  3.46 1.17 28 42 -0.46 
Foreign policy 2.63 0.60 19  2.89 0.85 27 44 -1.14 
Unemployment 2.24 1.01 25  2.84 1.25 32 55   -1.97* 
Environment 2.80 0.41 15  3.42 1.24 26 39     -1.88** 
Elderly care 2.88 0.96 16  3.35 1.27 23 37 -1.26 
Tax policy 2.79 0.97 14  3.08 1.12 25 37 -0.83 
Gender 
equality 
2.33 0.77 18 
 
2.79 1.01 29 45 -1.65 
Rural 
development 
2.67 0.62 15 
 
2.95 0.79 22 35 -1.19 
Child care 
policy 
2.04 0.75 24 
 
2.21 0.86 29 51 -0.74 
 No Stereotype (Male)  Stereotype (Male)   
Women M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
The Economy 2.78 0.72 36  2.45 0.72 31 65   1.84* 
Healthcare 2.38 0.90 40  2.05 0.87 38 76 1.61 
Agriculture 3.64 0.79 22  3.40 0.60 20 40 1.09 
Defence 3.63 0.88 24  3.23 0.75 22 44 1.65 
Education 2.54 0.93 37  2.37 1.14 35 70 0.69 
Transportation 3.63 0.92 24  3.05 0.90 22 44     2.15** 
Foreign policy 2.83 1.10 29  2.72 0.84 25 52 0.40 
Unemployment 2.34 1.17 41  2.11 1.13 37 76 0.89 
Environment 3.57 0.96 28  3.00 0.84 21 47     2.17** 
Elderly care  3.15 1.05 26  3.12 0.99 26 50 0.14 
Tax policy 3.04 1.00 26  2.79 0.88 24 48 0.92 
Gender 
equality 
2.97 1.06 32 
 
2.61 1.03 28 58 1.33 
Rural 
development 
3.09 0.79 23 
 
2.84 0.96 19 40 0.91 
Child care 
policy 
2.47 1.11 36 
 
2.00 0.92 32 66   1.90* 
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*p≤0.1 **p≤0.05. M = Mean rating. Lower is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number 
of respondents. DF = Degrees of Freedom. 1 = Very competent, 5 = Not competent. 
 
T-test. Additional evaluation of the politician - Group one and three 
 No Stereotype (Male)  Stereotype (Male)   










3.34 0.75 67 3.39 0.94 70 135 -0.29 










3.32 0.69 25 3.06 0.91 32 55  1.17 










3.37 0.80 41 3.70 0.85 37 76 -1.81* 
*p≤0.1 M = Mean rating. Higher is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of respondents. DF = Degrees 
of Freedom. § 1 = Would never want to support, 4 = Would certainly want to support. # 1 = No chance, 5 = Very 
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9.5 Appendix E - T-test tables for analysis of group two and four. 
T-test. Evaluation of Politician - Group two and four 
 No Stereotype (Female)  Stereotype (Female)   
All M SD N M SD N DF T-score 
As an MP 2.96 0.86 52 2.98 0.90 56 106 -0.12 
As prime 
minister 
3.19 0.98 53 3.43 1.02 54 105 -1.23 
Arguing 
policies 
2.91 0.82 58 3.06 1.01 62 118 -0.90 
Men M SD N M SD N DF T-score 
As an MP 3.19 0.75 16 3.35 1.18 20 34 -0.48 
As prime 
minister 
3.00 0.73 16 3.74 1.18 23 37     -2.23** 
Arguing 
policies 
2.59 0.71 17 3.23 1.34 26 41     -1.82** 
Women M SD N M SD N DF T-score 
As an MP 2.86 0.90 36 2.78 0.64 36 70  0.45 
As prime 
minister 
3.27 1.07 37 3.19 0.83 31 66  0.33 
Arguing 
policies 
3.05 0.84 41 2.94 0.67 36 75  0.60 
** p≤0.05 M = Mean rating. Lower is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of respondents. DF = 
Degrees of Freedom. 1 = Remarkable, 2 = Very good, 6 = Very bad. 
 
T-test. Competency rating in policy areas - Group two and four 
 No Stereotype (Female)  Stereotype (Female)   
All M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
The Economy 2.69 0.73 52  2.65 0.76 60 110  0.30 
Healthcare 2.26 1.01 56  2.39 1.09 62 117 -0.64 
Agriculture 3.41 0.89 34  3.41 0.87 41 73 -0.01 
Defence 3.59 0.96 34  3.24 0.98 42 74  1.56 
Education 2.33 0.98 52  2.74 1.01 62 112     -2.21** 
Transportation 3.38 0.98 37  3.09 0.96 46 81  1.36 
Foreign policy 2.79 0.97 43  2.80 0.99 45 86 -0.05 
Unemployment 2.29 0.91 56  2.55 1.16 58 112 -1.36 
Environment 3.37 1.07 41  3.04 0.82 45 84  1.57 
Elderly care 3.22 1.26 41  3.04 0.90 45 84  0.75 
Tax policy 3.09 1.06 45  2.93 0.85 46 89  0.76 
Gender 
equality 
2.45 1.00 47 
 
2.80 0.99 50 95 -1.75* 
Rural 
development 
2.74 0.74 35 
 
2.61 0.68 38 71  0.83 




2.21 1.00 47 
 
2.37 0.92 54 99 -0.83 
 No Stereotype (Female)  Stereotype (Female)   
Men M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
The Economy 2.88 0.81 16  2.69 0.74 26 40  0.75 
Healthcare 2.18 0.88 17  2.48 1.05 25 40 -0.98 
Agriculture 3.33 0.49 12  3.28 0.83 18 28  0.21 
Defence 3.73 0.79 11  3.28 1.07 18 27  1.20 
Education 2.19 0.83 16  2.80 0.96 25 39     -2.10** 
Transportation 3.36 1.01 14  2.67 0.91 18 30    2.03* 
Foreign policy 2.80 0.94 15  2.32 0.75 19 32   1.67 
Unemployment 2.38 0.81 16  2.42 1.28 24 38 -0.12 
Environment 3.75 0.87 12  2.84 0.76 19 29      3.06*** 
Elderly care 3.64 1.08 14  2.94 0.54 18 30      2.39** 
Tax policy 3.40 0.91 15  2.76 0.94 21 34      2.03** 
Gender 
equality 
2.50 0.85 14 
 
2.64 0.85 22 34 -0.47 
Rural 
development 
2.79 0.70 14 
 
2.42 0.51 19 31    1.74* 
Child care 
policy 
2.13 0.72 16 
 
2.45 0.96 22 36 -1.15 
 No Stereotype (Female)  Stereotype (Female)   
Women M SD N  M SD N DF T-score 
The Economy 2.61 0.69 36  2.62 0.78 34 68 -0.04 
Healthcare 2.30 1.07 40  2.32 1.13 37 75 -0.10 
Agriculture 3.45 1.06 22  3.52 0.90 23 43 -0.23 
Defence 3.52 1.04 23  3.21 0.93 24 45  1.09 
Education 2.39 1.05 36  2.70 1.05 37 71 -1.28 
Transportation 3.39 0.99 23  3.36 0.91 28 49  0.13 
Foreign policy 2.79 0.99 28  3.15 1.01 26 52 -1.35 
Unemployment 2.25 0.95 40  2.65 1.07 34 72   -1.69* 
Environment 3.21 1.11 29  3.19 0.85 26 53  0.05 
Elderly care 3.00 1.30 27  3.11 1.09 27 52 -0.34 
Tax policy 2.93 1.11 30  3.08 0.76 25 53 -0.56 
Gender 
equality 
2.42 1.06 33 
 
2.93 1.09 28 59   -1.83* 
Rural 
development 
2.71 0.78 21 
 
2.79 0.79 19 38 -0.30 
Child care 
policy 
2.26 1.12 31 
 
2.31 0.90 32 61 -0.21 
*p≤0.1 **p≤0.05 ***p≤0.01. M = Mean rating. Lower is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of 
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respondents. DF = Degrees of Freedom. 1 = Very competent, 5 = Not competent. 
 
T-test. Additional evaluation of the politician - Group two and four 
 No Stereotype (Female)  Stereotype (Female)   










3.40 0.75 58 3.37 0.95 59 115  0.15 










3.12 0.60 17 2.92 0.93 24 39  0.78 










3.51 0.78 41 3.69 0.83 35 74 -0.94 
M = Mean rating. Higher is better. SD = Standard Deviation. N = Number of respondents. DF = Degrees of 
Freedom. § 1 = Would never want to support, 4 = Would certainly want to support. # 1 = No chance, 5 = Very 
good chance, 6 = Will surely be elected. 
 
